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Most controverted of all is the question whether the law of negligence 
allows recovery for purely economic losses 1• 
John Fleming' s description of the situation conceming economic loss in 
the common law can equally be regarded as the ideal introduction for the 
situation in Switzerland. This very sentence captures the legal discussion 
conceming the recovery of purely economic loss in three general aspects. 
First, it shows that the issue of 'economic loss' itself is a subject for 
legal discussion in Swiss Law. The problem of purely economic loss is not 
divided into different groups of typical cases which are discussed separa-
tely from each other, like e.g. cases of negligent misrepresentation, negli-
gent performance of a service or losses which occur as a consequence of 
physical damage to a third party (better known as 'cable cases')2. At least 
in the field of scholarly discussion, Swiss Law groups all cases of 
economic loss together, enabling the issue to be dealt with on a more 
theoretical level. Many readers from Continental and Commonwealth juris-
dictions will take this approach for granted and may probably not even find 
it worth mentioning. But as F eldthusen3 has stated, there are these two 
opposing ways of approaching purely economic loss; in order to allow a 
comparative analysis this question needs to be looked at in advance. 
Furthermore, this sentence helps us to set up the legal framework of 
economic loss cases in Swiss Law. Although the structure of Swiss Tort 
Law does not allow a categorisation under the title of 'law of negligence', 
the use of this term leads us in the right direction. As Swiss Contract Law 
allows füll recovery also of purely economic losses, the problem is 
We would like to dedicate this article to the remembrance of John G. Fleming (1919 - 1997). All of 
us owe him a <lebt of gratitude for being 'the essential starting point for all those interested in the 
(common) law oftorts' (see KLAR, Tort Law, 2nd ed., Toronto 1996, preface). 
2 
FLEMING, An Introduction to the Law ofTorts, 2nd ed., Oxford 1985, p. 34. 
That is the very situation in the United States, see FELDTHUSEN, Economic Negligence, 3rd ed., 
Toronto/CalgaryNancouver 1994, p. 5. Notwithstanding we will deal with typical case groups in the 
second part ofthis article. 
See FELDTHUSEN, supra, note 2, p. 3 ff. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
formulating a statutory provision regulating economic loss but to leave it to 
judiciary discretion to find adequate solutions without opening the flood-
gates of indeterminate liability. 
B. Doctrinal Framework of Purely Economic Loss 
I. Definition 
Purely economic loss can only be defined by stating what it does not 
encompass 13 • This type of loss can neither be categorised as damage to 
persons nor to property. Hence purely economic loss consists of all finan-
cial losses neither consequent on the death or injury of a person nor on 
physical damage to personal property14. 
Doctrinal Restrictions of Recovery 
Bearing in mind the difficulties for establishing liability for purely 
economic loss in comparison with physical damage, Kramer aptly 
described it discrimination of purely economic losses 15 • The doctrinal 
reasons for this discrimination are mainly found in the context of the basic 
norm of tortious liability (art. 41 para. 1 C0)16• The elements for cause of 
action are listed therein. Hence only those losses which are caused by 
negligent ( or even wilful) and unlawful acts or omissions are to be com-
pensated by the wrongdoer' 7• As we can see, this provision does not contain 
a general rule of non-recoverability of purely economic loss; its very 
wording states compensation of all kinds of loss and does not exclude 
certain types of losses. Nevertheless art. 41 para. 1 CO is often referred to 
as containing a very restrictive rule for recovery of economic losses or even 
seen as a norm which, in principle, excludes that type of loss from compen-
sation in tort18 • The reason for that lies in the definition of the element of 
unlawfulness (Widerrechtlichkeit, illiceite, illiceita). 
13 
LORANDI, supra, note 7, p. 20. 
14 
See e.g. REY, Ausservertragliches Haftpflichtrecht, Zürich 1995, N 329; TERCIER, De la distinction 
entre dommage corporel, dommage materiel et autres dommages, Festschrift ASSISTA, Geneve 
1979, p. 247,254; BGE 118 II 176, 179; 119 II 127, 128 f. Feldthusen's definition is equally useful 
for Swiss Law: «A pure economic loss is a financial loss which is not causally consequent upon 
physical injury to the plaintiffs own person or property». FELDTHUSEN, supra, note 2, p. 1. 
15 
KRAMER, supra, note 7, p. 132. 
16 
Whoever unlawfully causes damage to another, whether willfully or negligently, shall be liable for 
damages. (Translation: SWISS-AMERICAN CHAMBER OF COMMERCE (ed.), Swiss Code of Obliations, 
English Translation ofthe Official Text, Volume I, Contract Law, Zurich 1990). 
17 
See also WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 182. 
18 
E.g. BGE 119 II 127, 128 f.; WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 181. 
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as patrimony in itself is not seen as an absolute right27, in order to establish 
liability for purely economic loss, it is necessary to find a suitable protec-
tive norm which was violated by the wrongdoer28• Such provisions for the 
protection of patrimony interests can mainly be found in the criminal law 
(such as criminal fraud) but also competition law. As these norms are still 
considered exceptional29 , it is understandable why economic loss in relation 
to physical damage is discriminated. The definition of unlawfulness leads 
to the result that purely economic loss is in principle not unlawful and 
therefore, in most cases, not recoverable30. 
This applies not only to the basic norm of art. 41 para. 1 CO but to all 
provisions requiring the element of unlawfulness. Norms which exclude 
certain types of losses ( such as economic loss31 ) state at the same time that 
these losses are not seen as unlawful in the context of that provision32• 
Within the general part of Tort Law, there is a provision which does not 
require unlawfulness as an element for establishing liability. In accordance 
with the civil law tradition Swiss Law equally implied the idea of the actio 
doli into its codification33 . Art. 41 para. 2 CO states that a person is liable 
for every loss which he or she causes wilfully and contra bonos mores34. 
Although this norm would enable to establish liability also for economic 
loss it does not play an important role in the case law35• Courts in Switzer-
land remain faithful to the wording of this provision and do not apply it in 
cases of ( even gross) negligence36 • Furthermore, its field of application 
declines more so because of the expansion of the term unlawfulness within 
art. 41 para. 1 CO or by the establishment of new forms of liability for 
purely economic loss37 • From the few cases where this provision can be 
applied those which are worth mentioning are the intentional interference 
27 See GABRIEL, supra, note 20, N 242; HONSELL, supra, note 23, § 2 N 5; DESCHENAUX/TERCIER, 
supra, note 20, § 6 N 22. 
28 Note that in case of violation of intellectual property rights, the damage can be categorised as purely 
economic loss because it is not consequent on physical harm to the person or property. This proves 
that exceptionally in cases of economic loss absolute rights can be infringed (see LORANDI, supra, 
note 7, p. 22; RASCHEIN, Die Widerrechtlichkeit im System des schweizerischen Haftpflichtrechts, 
doctoral thesis, Bern 1985, p. 299). These cases are normally not discussed under the heading of eco-
nomic loss, and therefore, equally left apart in this aricle. 
29 
WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 183. 
30 BGE 118 lb 163 f.; 118 Ib 473,476. 
31 
Such exclusionary provisions are e.g. art. 1 para. 1 PrHG; art. 58 para. 1 SVG; art. 27 ElG; art. 64 
para. 1 LFG; art. 33 para. 1 RLG. 
32 
See SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 53.02; 54.03. 
33 
See also § 826 BGB. 
34 Equally liable for damages is any person who willfully causes damage to another in violation of boni 
mores. 
35 
REY, supra, note 14, N 796 (with more references). 
36 
In German Law exactly this extension happened especially in cases of misrepresentation. 
37 
See SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 51.01. See also below. 
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exceeds the duties imposed by statute or company regulations45 . The same 
must be said for situations in which special norms are not available at all 
such as general information by banks46 or the liability for work references47 • 
2. Extension of the Classical Lonc,ept 
A possibility to extend liability for purely economic loss within the provi-
sion of art. 41 para. l CO consists of 'creating' norms for the protection of 
patrimony interests. This happens either by expanding the range of protec-
tion of existing norms or by applying protective norms where in fact there 
are none. 
The former was done by the F ederal Tribunal to establish liability in 
so-called cable cases49, where a provision of the Criminal Code for the 
protection of energy supply was applied as a protective norm50. Tue court 
held that this provision was not only meant to protect the public interest in 
being supplied with energy, but also the private ( economic) interest of each 
consumer51 • Having in mind the wording of the margin title ( disturbance of 
public utilities ), this wide interpretation remains questionable and has 
therefore been criticised52 . 
The latter strategy was applied in cases of liability for information 
towards extracontractual third parties (misrepresentation)53 • In Swiss Law 
there is no provision that implements a general duty to provide true and 
accurate information54. But in order to establish liability, the Federal 
Tribunal referred to an equivalent unwritten rule. The only legal basis for 
that can be seen in the principle of good faith laid down in art. 2 para. l 
CC55 . Tue problem is that this provision is neither accepted by the court 
45 
BGE 112 II 258, 261 ff. 
46 
See BGE 111 II 471. 
47 
See BGE 101 II 69. 
48 
See GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 122 ff.; GAUCH, supra, note 23, p. 232; WERRO, supra, note 4, 
p. 186 ff. 
49 
Fora more detailed discussion ofthis group of economic loss cases, see below, subtitle C.l. 
50 
Art. 239 Criminal Code. 
51 
See especially WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 187, note 39. 
52 
See e.g. MERZ, Obligationenrecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 1. Teilband, Schweizerisches Privatrecht, Band 
Vl/1, Basel/Frankfurt a.M. 1984, p. 191 f.; KRAMER, supra, note 7, p. 133; for more references see 
53 
LORANDI, supra, note 7, p. 24, note 46. 
For more detailed discussion of this group of economic loss cases below see infra subtitle C.ll. In 
accordance with the terminology of FELDTHUSEN, (supra, note 3), we will further refer to this group 
54 
as cases of misrepresentation. 
See KUHN, Die Haftung aus falscher Auskunft und falscher Raterteilung, SJZ 1986, 345, 353. Such 
55 
duties are only implemented on special professionals such as auditors, see supra, infra subtitle B.ll. l. 
Every person is bound to exercise his rights and fuljil his obligations according to the principles of 
good faith. (Translation: WYLERIWYLER, The Swiss Civil Code, English Version, Volume I, Zürich 
1987). 
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A more radical - but still tortious - solution ignores the element of 
unlawfulness completely and in all forms in case of nuisance. This happens 
by clearly stating that the loss in question is purely economic and that 
liability shall be established, although the behaviour causing the damage 
was not unlawful. This approach ignores the requirement of unlawfulness 
and establishes liability even for lawful acts63 . Accordingly, the Federal 
Tribunal held that a landowner responsible for a construction project had to 
compensate his neighbour for considerable and unavoidable losses, such as 
a decline in business, even if he is entitled to build by an official construc-
tion permit64 . The applied provision of art. 679 CC65 entitles neighbours to 
claim damages in case of nuisance by a neighbour landowner. lt is widely 
accepted that this right to claim damages not only applies to neighbours 
with a proprietary title but also to tenants66. In the situation of tenants, it 
can be said that only their obligatory rights are infringed. Hence the 
damage must be defined as purely economic loss. Nevertheless, the com-
plicated question of unlawfulness is not even asked. Here we find another 
hint that the law in action seems to ignore the classical concept of un-
lawfulness as it implements liability for purely economic loss without the 
violation of a protective norm67 . 
Another way to avoid the requirement of unlawfulness, is by applying 
legal constructions where this element is not mandatory. This means that in 
order to implement recovery for purely economic loss the basis of liability 
has to be non-tortious68 . We would like to refer to those constructions 
which do play an actual role in economic loss cases in Switzerland. 
One traditional possibility in establishing liability for purely economic 
loss without referring to a contractual claim is the concept of liability for 
breach of precontractual duties, better known to Continental readers as 
63 
See GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 126; GAUCH, supra, note 23, p. 233; WERRO, supra, note 4, 
p. 188. 
64 
BGE 83 II 375; 91 II 100; 114 II 230; see for further theoretical explanations GAUCH/SWEET, supra, 
65 
note 7, p. 126, note 73. 
Where damage is caused or threatened by an owner of land who exceeds his rights of ownership, the 
party injured can apply to the court for an order that the damage shall be made good or for an 
injunction to restrain the continuance of the wrang and for damages for the wrang done. 
66 
BGE 119 II 411,415; REY, supra, note 14, N 1113 ff. (with more references). 
67 
See also GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 126. 
68 We follow the traditional opinion that not every breach of a contractual (or near-contractual) obliga-
tion is unlawful (BGE 74 II 23, 26; see e.g. SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 50.06; BREHM, Berner 
Kommentar, Art. 41 N 41; DESCHENAUX/TERCIER, supra, note 20, § 6 N 23). Theoretically it can also 
be advocated that art. 41 para. 1 is the basic norm for all forms ofliability. A contractual liability e.g. 
could be based on the argument that the breach of the contractual obligation meets with the require-
ment of unlawfulness between the contractual parties (see especially JÄGGI, Zum Begriff der ver-
traglichen Schadenersatzforderung, Festgabe für Wilhelm Schönenberger, Freiburg i.Ue. 1968, 
p. 181 ff.). Although this idea is highly dogmatic and does surely not help to solve economic loss 
cases involving third parties (i.e. mainly cases of misrepresentation and negligent performance of a 
service) it was proposed to implement it into the revised General Part ofTort Law (see art. 13 para. 2 
draft for a General Part ofTort Law). 
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declarations79 • In the second case80, it was decided that the Swiss Wrestling 
Association had to pay damages to a wrestler who was excluded from 
participation in the world championship toumament. He had fulfilled all the 
qualifications required by the wrestling association, but after changing the 
rules at short notice, another wrestler was favoured. Tue court held that the 
wrestling association, which had no contractual relationship with the plain-
tiff, had violated the principle of good faith. Notwithstanding the require-
ment of unlawfulness not being met, this should provide a cause of action 
in case of breach of confidence. The Federal Tribunal found that the same 
idea is already realised in the liability for breach of precontractual duties 
( culpa in contrahendo ), liability for negligent misrepresentation and the 
liability for breach of confidence in a group (Swissair-case) which are all to 
be understood as aspects of a general principle of a liability for breach of 
confidence81 • The details of this newly established liability still remain quite 
vague, and the necessity of the whole concept seems questionable82 . 
A 'classical' way to bypass the shortcomings of Tort Law is the use of 
contractual constructions because the law of contract does not discriminate 
against purely economic loss. All types of damage are principally reco-
verable83. Generally it can be stated that in Switzerland, contract law does 
not play an important role in connection with economic loss cases. The few 
possibilities which are mentioned by legal scholars84 never found their way 
into the case law or were even expressly declined85 . 
In a case conceming the liability of auditors86 , the Federal Tribunal, after 
noting that 'all these theories were not much echoed in Switzerland', 
discussed the contractual instruments of shifting of interest (Drittschadens-
liquidation; deplacement de l'interet), contract with protective effect vis-a-
vis third parties (Vertrag mit Schutzwirkung gegenüber Dritten; contrat 
comportant un effet de protection envers les tiers )87 and third-party-
beneficiary-contract but refused to apply any of them in the very case. The 
79 To our knowledge it has never been argued how the use of the name of the parent company could 
establish liability of the subsidiary company. For further discussions, see AMSTUTZ/W A TTER, case 
note Swissair-case, AJP 1995, p. 502 ff.; DRUEY, case note Swissair-case, SZW 1995, p. 93 ff.; 
GONZENBACH, Senkrechtstarter oder Bruchlandung?, recht 1995, p. 117 ff.; SCHNYDER, Haftung aus 
erwecktem Konzernvertrauen im schweizerischen Recht und mögliche Auswirkungen auf das 
Kollisionsrecht, Collisio Legum per Gerardo Broggini, Milano 1996, p. 485 ff. 
80 BGE 121 III 350 
81 
BGE 121 III 350, 354 ff. 
82 
See SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 52.03; WIEGAND, case note, ZBJV 1997, p. 114 ff. 
83 
See SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 14.17. 
84 
See e.g. GABRIEL, supra, note 20, N 778 ff.; 796 ff.; GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 125 f.; GAUCH, 
85 
supra, note 23, p. 233. 
The contrary is true for the situation in German law where contractual constructions play a decisive 




See SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 87.01 ff. (with more references). 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
ricochet)93 . The plaintiff suffers loss because property belonging to a third 
party - in this case a cable for power supply - is damaged. On a theoretical 
level, these cases face a double discrimination since the recovery of indi-
rect loss is equally restricted94• In principle only a person directly affected 
by damage is entitled to sue. Financial loss which is consequential to the 
loss of another person (i.e. secondary loss) is not recoverable95 • Only in 
case of wrongful death, art. 45 para. 3 CO declares the indirect losses of 
dependants as recoverable. This norm is generally interpreted as the excep-
tion to the rule of non-recoverability96 • The categorical bar to secondary 
loss has been more and more criticised97 . 
The Swiss F ederal Tribunal decided the three cable cases showing both 
elements of secondary and economic loss98 • Interestingly, the two doctrinal 
problems were treated as one. 
In the first two cases, the court held that an injured party could be seen 
as directly affected if the loss had resulted from a violation of a specific 
norm for the protection ofhis interests99 . The questions of unlawfulness and 
secondary loss are, hence, one and the same; whenever a damage has 
occurred in an unlawful manner, it is equally treated as direct loss. The 
necessary protective norm was found in art. 23 9 of the Criminal Code, a 
norm protecting the public interest in energy supply' 00 and accordingly, the 
wrongdoers were held liable for the loss of profits101 • In both cases the court 
did not separately discuss the question of recoverability of purely economic 
loss. 
But in the third cable case this very question became crucial. The reason 
for that can be found in the different statutory provisions which were 
applied in the three cases as the basis for liability. While in the first two 
cases the claims were based on provisions requiring the elements of art. 41 
93 
GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 123. 
94 See e.g. MEIERHANS, Der immer noch nicht bewältigte Reflexschaden, recht 1994, p. 202 ff.; REY, 
supra, note 14, N 350 ff.; DESCHENAUx/TERCIER, supra, note 20, § 3 N 29 ff.; SCHWENZER, supra, 
note 23, N 14.19 ff. (with detailed references). 
95 See e.g. REY, supra, note 14, N 356; HONSELL, supra, note 23, § 1 N 51; BGE 99 II 223; for further 
citations see MEIERHANS, supra, note 94, p. 204, note 21. 
96 See BREHM, supra, note 68, art. 41 N 19. 
97 See SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 14.22; STARK, Zur Frage der Schädigungen ohne Vermögens-
nachteile, Festschrift Keller, Zürich 1989, 311,320. LORANDI (supra, note 7, p. 22) sees the doctrine 
98 
ofnon-recoverability already as overcome. 
BGE 101 lb 252; 102 II 85; 106 II 75. BGE 97 II 221 was not a typical cable case as there seems not 
to have been secondary loss, see BREHM, supra, note 68, Art. 41 N 17; KRAMER, supra, note 7, 
p. 132 f., note 29. In case of nervous shock only the element of secondary loss is fulfilled. Therefore, 
the discussion includes only cable cases and no other forms of secondary losses. Note that the Federal 
Tribunal treats nervous shock as direct loss (BGE 112 II 118, 124; REY, supra, note 14, N 353). 
99 
BGE 101 lb 252, 255; 102 II 85, 89 f. 
IOO See the discussion supra, infra subtitle B III 2. 
1 o I In both cases no physical damage occurred. 
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information contracts. In older cases, it was mandatory that advice or 
information either had to be given in the course of a specific business or 
was paid for108 • Now a contractual liability for negligent advice is also 
accepted if there is a pre-existing contractual relationship between the 
parties109 • 
Information appears in various forms. Among the most significant cases 
where the Federal Tribunal applied normal tort provisions we find credit 
information by banks, information conceming a former employee in a work 
reference, statements by public authorities and, exceptionally, auditing 
reports" 0• As already stated, we will not deal with those misrepresentation 
cases where special statutory provisions for the recovery of purely 
economic loss can be applied such as the liability for misleading statements 
in a prospectus or the liability of auditors in general. In these cases, the 
recoverability of purely economic loss is widely accepted. 
In several cases the F ederal Tribunal allowed recovery of economic loss 
caused by negligent statements. 
The Federal Tribunal held that the auditing company of a bank, was 
liable to the creditors of a bank although the special provisions of company 
law conceming the liability of auditors were not applicable111 • In a series of 
cases, the court awarded damages to parties relying on statements not 
appearing in a specified form 112• In all cases they were given information 
which was relevant for the establishment or the continuation of some eco-
nomic relations which tumed out to be a losing business; they invested into 
a companym, did not sell shares in time notwithstanding rumours about the 
bad economic situation of the company1 '4, paid money into a savings depo-
sit after being misinformed about the possible dass of claim in case of 
bankruptcy115, entered a business partnership with a person whose identity 
was misrepresented to him116 or delivered goods on credit to a company 
after wrongfully being informed about the economic situation of the inten-
ded dient. In the latter case, the information was not given directly to the 
108 See esp. KRAMER, supra, note 77, N 66; KUHN, supra, note 54, p. 348 ff.; KAISER, supra, note 107, 
p. 25 ff. 
109 See WEBER, Basler Kommentar, art. 394 N 19. 
11 ° F or the latter see supra, infra subtitle B. III. 1. 
111 
BGE 117 ll 315. 
112 
BGE 411177; 57 ll 81; 68 II 295; 80 III 41; 111 II 471; for older cases see KUHN, supra, note 54, 
p. 348, note l; FISCHER, supra, note 107, p. 19 f. The claim was denied for lack offault in BGE 53 II 
336, 341 ff In BGE 30 II 258, 267 ff. the court distinguished between advice and mere opinions. For 
the latter, intentional behaviour was seen as necessary to establish liability which could not be 
proved. 
113 BGE 41 II 77. 
114 
BGE 57 II 81. 
115 
BGE 68 II 295. 
116 
BGE 80 III 41. 
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objective point of view apt to mislead the plaintiff21 . Still on a case-by-
case basis, the principle of liability for negligent misstatements was further 
developed. The Federal Tribunal could state accordingly later that a person 
is held liable if he or she is asked because of his special knowledge, and 
then wilfully gives the requested information and thereby either 
intentionally or negligently makes untrue statements - although it is 
obvious that the required information is crucial for the decision in 
question. The person asked accepts a position of responsibility which 
imposes a 'duty of care ' and in case of violation of that duty damages are 
owed122 • 
In these cases the F ederal Tribunal did not mention any further require-
ments. Nevertheless it was stated by scholars that the crucial element to 
establish liability for negligent misrepresentation is the breach of confi-
dence on which the injured party relied123 . This requirement was first 
accepted by the Federal Tribunal in an unpublished decision124, later it 
appeared in form of the independent action for breach of confidence 
(Swissair-case125). 
We also find a case where the outcome was negative for the plaintiffs126 . 
Producers of soft cheese claimed recovery of their loss of profits from the 
Federal Government. Sales of soft cheese had fallen sharply after an infor-
mation campaign by the Govemment about certain risks of a possible con-
tamination with listeria. These bacteria had been found in a special type of 
soft cheese, Vacherin Mont d'Or. The Federal Tribunal held that no norms 
for the protection of patrimony interests had been violated127. Even so the 
discussion of protective norms did not remain the essential point, and the 
court gave much attention to stating that the Govemment had not acted 
against any duties to take reasonable care. Tue claim was dismissed. 
lt can be concluded that in Switzerland, liability for purely economic 
loss in case of misrepresentation is widely accepted128 . On the one hand, 
121 
BGE 41 II 77, 82; see also FISCHER, supra, note 107, p. 19 f. The Federal Tribunal did not deal with 
the question of unlawfulness in BGE 68 II 295, 303 where the misstatement was seen as breach of a 
precontractual duty ( culpa in contrahendo ). 
122 
Translation by the authors: ... schadenersatzpflichtig wird, wer aufgrund seines Fachwissens in An-
spruch genommen wird, wunschgemäss Auskünfte erteilt .. . und dabei wider besseres Wissen oder 
leichtfertig Angaben macht ... ; von denen er sich sagen muss, dass ihre Kenntnis den in Frage stehen-
den Entschluss beeinflussen könnten. Der Befragte übernimmt dabei eine Garantenstellung, die eine 
ausservertragliche Sorgfaltspflicht und bei deren schuldhafter Verletzung eine Schadenersatzpflicht 
123 
begründet. (BGE 116 II 695, 699). 
See FISCHER, supra, note 107, p. 23 ff.; also KAISER, supra, note 107, p. 173 f. 
124 
Case 4C.211/1989, cited in BGE 121 III 350, 355; see also WIEGAND, supra, note 82, p. 116. 
125 
See supra, text accompanying note 75. 
126 
BGE 118 Ib 473; see esp. WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 193. 
127 
For details see WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 193, note 66. 
128 
Note that in many cases damages were reduced for contributory negligence. 
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they should have specified the conditions of provision 132 • Tue court saw the 
element of unlawfulness fulfilled by the creation of an undue risk in not 
taking the necessary precautions to protect third parties from loss 133 • 
In both cases liability was based on the tortious action of art. 41 para. l 
CO, although a protective norm was again not available. In the first case, 
the court assumed unlawfulness without referring at all to protective norms. 
lt was taken from the aptness of wrongful crediting to mislead third parties. 
In the second case, the bank had violated provisions of the Uniform Rules 
and Usage of the International Chamber of Commerce in Paris. As these 
rules are not part of objective law (i.e. regulations implemented by the state 
legislator ), the court held that this violation did not meet with the require-
ment of unlawfulness. lnstead the court assumed liability because of an 
unlawful omission applying the doctrine of undue risk134• 
In a more recent case the F ederal Tribunal applied a statutory norm con-
ferring third-party-beneficiary-rights against a bank not in privity with the 
plaintiff 35• The question of unlawfulness and the fact of prescription of an 
eventual tortious action could be bypassed. lt was also stated that a direct 
claim must also be granted for policy reasons ( distribution of risk among 
the parties)136 • This reasoning resembles the way the requirement of un-
lawfulness was handled if the actions were tortious. 
2. Publk Duties 
In several cases the F ederal Tribunal ruled on the question of liability for 
the alleged wrongful performance of public duties. For claims against the 
State137 the crucial point was whether the authorities or persons in charge 
had acted unlawfully. 
In two cases, the court entered judgement for the plaintiffs who had suf-
fered economic loss as a result of errors on the part of the judge. In the first 
case, the judge had not paid attention to all relevant materials and had, 
therefore, ruled that the plaintiff s rights could not be secured by the 
creation of a mortgage by registration 138 • Tue ruling was wrong but could 
not be corrected by the court of Appeal. The Federal Tribunal held that the 
fact of not paying careful attention to all relevant materials was unlawful. 
In the second case, a judge informed the creditor of a company only three 
132 
BGE 93 II 329; the facts were stated by WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 193 f., note 68. 
133 
BGE 93 II 329, 339 ff. 
134 
See e.g. REY, supra, note 14, N 753 ff.; SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 50.32 f. 
13 5 
B GE 121 III 3 10; see supra, text accompanying note 8 8. 
136 
BGE 121 III 310,317 f. 
137 
Claims are normally based on provisions ofpublic law implementing State liability for wrongful acts 
of its representatives. 
138 
BGE 79 II 424. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
The latter cases have already been mentioned as an example for liability 
for lawful acts147 • The damage mainly appears as loss of profits because of 
a decline in a store' s business due to the neighbouring building site. The 
Federal Tribunal allowed the cause of action for damages in these cases148 • 
In addition the court entered judgement for the plaintiffs who had taken 
special security measures against the activities due to a neighbouring 
shelter for drug addicts; the defendant Canton running this shelter was held 
liable for damages 149• 
While the Federal Tribunal took a liberal position in cases of neighbour 
law, it remained faithful to its discriminatory position against purely eco-
nomic loss when deciding claims between non-contractual parties both 
involved in a construction project150• The court rejected a claim by a 
contractor against an architect hired by the owner of a construction 
project151 as well as the one of a contractor against the engineering com-
pany for negligently causing additional costs that were not otherwise 
compensable152 • In the latter case, tortious liability to the non-contractual 
injured party was denied, while the engineering company was clearly liable 
for breach of contract towards the landowner. For that reason, partial com-
pensation could be granted by application of the rule regarding recourse 
among persons jointly liable for the causation of damage (art. 51 CO). In 
both cases the reason for the rejection of a tortious cause of action was the 
type of damage for which no protective norm was available. Art. 229 of the 
Criminal Code dealing with the crime of violating fundamental rules of 
safe construction, was not interpreted as a protective norm against the 
occurrence of economic loss153 • On the same ground the Federal Tribunal 
denied a tortious claim of a buyer against a contract-seller of a house for 
damages caused by costs for reinforcing an embankment because of a 
landslide154• 
147 Supra, text accompanying note 63. 
148 BGE 83 II 375; 91 II 100; 11411 230; see also REY, supra, note 14, N 1123 ff. 
149 BGE 119 II 411. 
150 See WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 194 f. 
]'il 
· BGE 115 II 42; the facts are stated by WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 194. 
152 
BGE 119 II 127. 
L,J BGE 119 II 127, 129; see the contrary interpretation ofart. 239 Criminal Code in cable cases; infra 
subtitle C. I. 
154 BGE 117 II 259,270; this decision was critisised, see GAUCH, supra, note 23, p. 233; WERRO, supra, 
note 4, p. 195 f. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
The doctrine of culpa in contrahendo163 deals with wrongful acts or omis-
sions in a precontractual stadium. By analysing the case law, we find two 
main situations which group together singular precontractual duties for the 
protection of economic interests164• 
On the one hand, there are cases where liability is imposed due to the 
non-formation of a valid contract. According to the principle of freedom of 
contract a party is generally free to break off negotiations. But a party may 
not start negotiations without the true and real intention to contract165 • In 
case of breach ofthis duty, he or she can be held liable166• This can also be 
the case if someone knowingly concludes an illegal (void) contract167, does 
not inform the other party about formal conditions for making the contract 
valid or does not fulfil his or her duty to obtain a required permission from 
a public authority168 • 
On the other hand a party can be held liable when the formation of a 
contract tums out tobe detrimental to the other party. In these cases liabi-
lity is based on a breach of specific duties of information and disclosure 
which need to be specified on a case-to-case basis169• As duties to inform 
generally play an important role this doctrine can also be applied as basis of 
liability in misrepresentation cases 170 • 
Also the causation of damage to the environment can be seen in connection 
with economic loss. Ecological damage often appears without the infrin-
gement of individual rights171 • Therefore all costs which are consequential 
to damage to the environment, such as pollution of air, water or ground, 
must be qualified as purely economic loss. This is also the case if, for 
example, a population of fish in a river is extinguished without violating a 
proprietary fishing right. 
Despite the dogmatic difficulties, the F ederal Tribunal held two compa-
nies that had caused water pollution liable for the costs of rehabilitating the 
163 
See supra, text accompanying note 69. 
164 
See GAUCH/SCHLUEP, Schweizerisches Obligationemecht, Allgemeiner Teil, 6th ed., Zürich 1995, 
N 948 ff.; SCHWENZER, supra, note 23, N 47.07 ff. · 
165 
BGB 105 II 75, 79 f. 
166 
BGB 77 II 135, 137; for further references see KRAMER, Berner Kommentar, art. 22 N 12 ff. 
167 
BGB 36 II 193, 203. 
168 
BGB 98 II 23, 28 f. 
169 
For detailed references see KRAMER, Berner Kommentar, art. 22 N 33 ff. 
170 
E.g. BGB 68 II 295. 
171 
The possible aspects of ecological damage are presented by MOLLER-CHEN, Entwicklungen im euro-
päischen Umwelthaftungsrecht, SZIER 1997, p. 213,228 ff. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
Although the importance of this concept is stressed repeatedly, the case 
law has found different ways to bypass its narrow restrictions, namely by 
'creating' suitable norms for the protection of patrimony interests. This is 
possible by a wide interpretation of statutory norms as it was done by the 
Federal Tribunal in some of the cable cases. Another possibility is to refer 
to very general rules, such as the principle of goodfaith (misrepresentation 
cases), the doctrine of undue risk (negligent financial service) or the prohi-
bition of arbitrary acts by State authorities (public duties ), in order to meet 
with the requirement of unlawfulness. These rules alone though cannot be 
seen as protective norms in general. lt is only on a case-by-case basis that 
these principles are interpreted accordingly. The use of non-tortious ways, 
for which the element of unlawfulness and subsequently a violation of a 
protective norm must not be fulfilled, is not very common in Switzerland to 
establish liability for purely economic loss. Traditionally, only the concept 
of liability for breach of precontractual duties ( culpa in contrahendo) is 
widely accepted as an independent cause of action. Although contract law 
could extend its range of application in cases of misrepresentation and 
financial services, e.g. by the acceptance of information contracts without 
consideration, contractual actions are (in contrast to Germany) still relati-
vely uncommon to establish liability in economic loss situations. Recently, 
the Federal Tribunal found a new way by accepting an independent liability 
for breach of confidence. 
The arbitrariness of judicial treatment of economic loss is not only due 
to the question of availability of a protective norm, but even more to the 
uncertainty whether the strict rule of non-recoverability is going to be 
applied or not. This can be best shown by the group of so called Building 
Cases. The Federal Tribunal remained faithful to the traditional concept 
between non-contractual parties involved in a building project. Contrary to 
that, the liability for purely economic loss also goes quite far if neighbour 
law can be applied. Despite the closer relationship within the parties of the 
first case group 179, their claim for damages is handled more restrictively. 
Bearing in mind the complicated situation conceming economic loss, it 
seems important to us to find a new approach to this legal problem. 
The starting point of this approach must be a clear commitment that a 
general exclusion of purely economic loss cannot be accepted any longer as 
the basic rule of Tort Law180 • A look at the case law proves the truth ofthis 
179 
The relationship has been qualified as being 'the functional equivalent to privity'. Williams and Sons 
Erectors v. South Carolina Steel, 983 F2d 1176 (2nd Cir 1993); the reference is taken from WERRO, 
supra, note 4, p. 195, note 72. 
180 
See GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 136; WERRO, supra, note 4, p. 191; similar: Bericht der Studien-
kommission für die Gesamtrevision des Haftpflichtrechts/Rapport de la commission d'etude pour la 
revision totale du droit de la responsabilite civile, supra, note 12, p. 44. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
enacted in Switzerland neither favours the compensation of physical 
damage nor discriminates against purely economic loss by making its reco-
very only dependant on protective norms. Accepting the new concept of 
unlawfulness would, therefore, even mean to be more faithful to the real 
character of statutory Tort Law. On the other hand it would not amount to a 
total equalisation of all kinds of loss. The recovery of economic loss can 
still be dealt with more restrictively; a human being simply owes more 
duties towards other persons' personal integrity than towards their eco-
nomic interests. Whether this is also true in relation to property damage 
seems at least questionable184. But the concept of duty of care would leave 
room for discussion. 
The new concept also embodies with the essence of case law in relation 
to economic loss. A careful analysis of the reasoning shows that the 
element of unlawfulness is often established without really applying 
protective norms. This can be observed in the older cases of misrepresen-
tation and negligent service, where the term unlawfulness often not even 
appears. In fact the idea of a breach of a duty of care is also the essential 
point in all other cases within the group of misrepresentation and service. 
How tortious liability is established in more recent cases of negligent mis-
representation is often interpreted as 'creating protective norms' 185 . In the 
very cases186 the court noticeably did not refer again expressly to protective 
norms but only to unlawfulness. Therefore, it can be concluded that this 
condition is fulfilled if a duty for the protection of the interests infringed is 
violated187• This is also possible if no protective norm is violated, as it is 
especially the case if the principle of good faith based on a special 
relationship of confidence is violated. A duty can also develop after the 
creation of an undue risk; although this principle can not be qualified as a 
protective norm itself. In an old case conceming breach of public duties, 
the Federal Tribunal even expressly stated that unlawfulness could only be 
established by referring to the relevant duties of the authority, and the fol-
lowing cases were dealt with accordingly. lt must be stressed that it is not 
only the duty that matters but the breach of it. In more recent cases, claims 
for damages were rejected not because none of the protective norms were 
184 
See also Stevenson J. in Canadian National Railway v. Norsk Pacific Steamship Co. (1992) 91 
D.L.R. (4th) 289, 383: Same argue that there is afundamental distinction between physical damage 
(personal and property damage) and pure economic lass and that the latter is less worthy of protec-
tion ... but 1 am left unconvinced. Although 1 am prepared to recognise that a human being is more 
important than property and lost expectations of profit, 1 fail to see how property and economic 
lasses can be distinguished. 
185 
See especially GAUCH/SWEET, supra, note 7, p. 122 ff.; also supra, passim. 
186 
BGE 111 II 471 ff.; see also BGE 116 ll 695,699. 
187 
See also KUHN, supra, note 54, p. 353. 
ECONOMIC LOSS 
Much will be said against this new concept. The fear of 'opening the 
floodgates of indeterminate liability' will be articulated again. But this 
concept does not mean that every loss should be compensated191 . The 
boundaries of liability can even be stricter. Furthermore, it will be argued 
that this concept causes much uncertainty and the outcome of a case could 
not be predicted anymore. This might be right, but the level of uncertainty 
and unpredictability will not be any higher than present. Nobody knows 
today whether a court will apply the strict rule of Tort Law or whether it 
will allow cause of action for damages either by a wide interpretation of 
unlawfulness or by applying another basis of liability. lt is true that the 
question of duty to take care must be answered on a case-to-case basis. In 
order to further certainty of the law, it will be important to discuss all the 
(policy) factors openly. These factors differ from case group to case group; 
therefore the discussion of 'purely economic loss' should probably be 
abandoned in exchange for a discussion of relevant factors of liability in 
each case group. For this, comparative considerations will be extremely 
helpful. 
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